My analysis of the Revisions of Dr. Fadl, published on 28 November 2008 at the National (UAE) newspaper, but no longer available online.
Al Qa’eda doesn’t enjoy the best press in the Arab world, but the savage attack against the organisation that filled an Egyptian newspaper for two weeks in late 2007 was still remarkable. Every aspect of its operations was subjected to withering criticism, and its leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, were assailed with a barrage of insults.
The critic in question, Sayyid Imam, was no ordinary writer: he was a man with impeccable jihadist credentials, writing from the Egyptian jail where he is serving a life sentence. Active in militant circles since his student days at Cairo University, Imam, also known as Dr Fadl, was a long-time associate of Zawahiri who participated in the Afghan jihad against the Soviets and then served as the Emir of the Egyptian terror group al Jihad from 1987 until 1993, having moved with bin Laden and Zawahiri to Sudan to continue the work of jihad. Most importantly, Imam had written two theoretical books that embraced an ultra-literal interpretation of the Quran, which Jihadists, including bin Laden and Zawahiri had been using to justify their violence.
Many in the United States took Imam’s text – formally called Rationalising Jihad in Egypt and the World, but typically known as the Revisions – as a serious blow to al Qa’eda, suggesting that the defection of Imam and other prominent figures augured a turn by jihadists, fed up with al Qa’eda’s excessive violence, against bin Laden and Zawahiri.
Many commentators saw the Revisions as a potential turning point in the Global War on Terror. But now, a year later, Imam has published his follow-up, a long screed called The Exposure – and the sequel confirms that last year’s round of optimism was little more than wishful thinking.
In an article called “The Unraveling” in June, noted terrorism analyst Peter Bergen cited Imam’s Revisions as part of a global pattern of “hardline Islamists turning against al Qa’eda in unprecedented numbers.”
“Is the global terror network self-destructing?” he asked.
Responses in the Arab world were more subdued, but some, such as Dia Rashwan of Cairo’s Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, suggested that there was cause for optimism. Rashwan pointed to Imam’s status – he was the former leader of al Jihad, the teacher of key al Qa’eda ideologues like Abu Musab al Suri, and the author of important jihadist texts – to argue that the Revisions were likely to exert a significant influence on al Qa’eda.
What cannot be doubted is that Zawahiri – who bore the brunt of Imam’s attacks, thanks to a long rivalry between the two men – felt compelled to respond: in March he published a 200-page riposte to Imam’s allegations, mounting a not-entirely convincing defense of al Qa’eda’s tactics and implying that Imam was merely speaking at the behest of his jailers.
But others remained sceptical about the efficacy of Imam’s apostasy, and a close look at the Revisions would suggest that they are anything but a wholesale renunciation of jihad.
“Sayyid Imam never said that the Ruler is actually a believer,” explained Rafiq Habib, an Egyptian expert on Islamist movements. “He merely said that trying to overthrow the Ruler when you do not have the capability is wrong.”
The Revisions simply represent a more conservative interpretation of what constitutes legitimate jihadist tactics: progress, to be sure, but hardly a radical turn. Referring to the September 11 hijackers, who entered the United States legally, Imam argued – citing several passages from the Quran – that Muslims who licitly enter the Domain of War (non-Muslim countries) have entered a legal contract with the government, which obligates them not to conduct jihad. Elsewhere he argued that a Muslim could not participate in the jihad without obtaining the permission of his parents, “because it is anobligation to be obedient to one’s parents.”
He declared that attacking tourists visiting Muslim lands was illegitimate because – in today’s age of migration – some of them might actually be Muslims. For a man who previously endorsed the blanket use of violence without scruples, these new positions did represent a revision of sorts – but merely of rules and rationales.
Imam is not against violence in principle: in a long interview with al Hayat after the publication of the Revisions, he counselled against jihad in Iraq and Palestine – “because they will not lead to the creation of an Islamic state” but praised the Taliban regime and endorsed the jihad in Afghanistan, “because America does not understand the Afghan people who take money from the Americans and then quietly help the Taliban.”
Essentially, Fadl was attacking al Qa’eda’s undisciplined or indiscriminate use of violence, and the damage it has caused the jihad. Mocking Zawahiri, he asked: “what good does it do to destroy one of the enemy’s buildings, when in return he destroys an entire Muslim country?”
The question of Imam’s present significance to the jihad movement suggested another reason to doubt the Revisions would devastate al Qa’eda. While Imam was once close to bin Laden and Zawahiri, he had not been part of any militant group since resigning as emir of al Jihad in 1993.
His books, written in 1988 and 1993, were cited by al Qa’eda to justify terrorism, but he had no contact with the group after leaving Sudan for Yemen in 1994. “Dr Fadl may have been important at one time, but he is no longer an influential thinker in the jihadist movement,” said Khalil al Anani, a scholar of Political Islam at the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo.
Furthermore, the Revisions said little that was new, at least not in Egypt, where militant groups had long since abandoned violence; the largest, al Gamaa al Islamiyya, had published a series of books four years earlier renouncing violence and outlining a comprehensive new approach to dealing with a closed political system that they did not deem properly Islamic.
Imam was merely coming to the same conclusions that most other Egyptian militants had already reached a few years earlier.
“I don’t think Sayyid Imam will have any influence on the state of militant groups in Egypt,” said Hussam Tamem, another expert on Islamist movements, “as the state has succeeded in making the returnof any violence highly unlikely.”
Above all, Imam’s Revisions suggested no alternative vision for jihadist movements beyond violence. As Rafiq Habib noted in an interview shortly after their publication: “violence was not the result of a particular reading of Islamic Sharia, but a reaction to a certain social and political reality.”
Pronunciations of Takfir and violence were an attempt to deal with that reality, Habib added: Sayyid Imam merely criticised al Qa’eda’s strategy for dealing with this reality.
Without presenting an alternative, the sincerity of his conversion remained questionable, and limited his appeal to other jihadists.
If the 2007 book was mostly a criticism of al Qa’eda’s tactics, but not necessarily of violence in itself, this did not mean that Sayyid Imam could not eventually present a more advanced thesis. Because of the author’s extreme fanaticism, dramatic ideological changes overnight would not be easy.
Much depended on what else Imam would say.
Did the Revisions represent the beginning of a serious process of reflection, to be followed by further writings that attempted to develop some kind of alternative approach? Or was the 2007 book a cynical attempt by an imprisoned militant to get out of jail – or to settle scores with his rival Zawahiri?
When news broke that Sayyid Imam had written a new book in response to Zawahiri that would be published in Egypt’s al Masri al Youm newspaper, it seemed an answer was forthcoming.
But The Exposure, appearing in serial form over the past two weeks, offers very little indeed. Though packed with new insults against bin Laden and Zawahiri, The Exposure is a retread of the Revisions, salted with a few new titbits of jihadist dirty laundry designed to embarrass al Qa’eda’s leaders.
Imam claims that Zawahiri was not informed about the September 11 attacks until shortly before they took place; elsewhere he impugns bin Laden’s honesty, noting that the al Qa’eda leader had made a pledge to the Taliban’s Mullah Omar not to plot attacks against the United States.
In another section he taunts the group for not carrying out operations in Palestine, comparing them unfavourably to Palestinian groups who are far more sophisticated politically and militarily.
Imam’s biggest motivation seems to be his hatred of Zawahiri and a desire to settle scores with him – he never misses an opportunity to insult his long-time rival: “Zawahiri is like an idiot doctor who only knows one treatment for a disease which he repeats continuously.”
Imam’s only remotely new idea is his contention that bin Laden and Zawahiri are attempting to trick Muslims by convincing them America is to blame for their problems.
But his argument is arcane and poorly constructed: he cites a few stories from the Quran in which the Prophet Mohammed tells his followers not to blame others for their woes – and on this basis Imam argues that anyone who denies that the problems of Muslims today are their own fault is an infidel.
In one ludicrous formulation, he writes: “Allah says that Muslims’ problems are due to their own faults, but Bin Laden and Zawahiri say they are because of America. Who do Muslims believe: Allah, or bin Laden and Zawahiri?”
Imam mounts a convincing and thorough assault on the “ends justify the means” approach of al Qa’eda, but neither this new text nor the original Revisions seem likely to have any serious effect on the global jihadist movement, owing to his failure to go beyond merely advising militants to put down their arms – or use them more strategically.
Al Gama’a al Islamiyya was formerly one of the most violent jihadist groups in modern Arab history – and they not only disarmed, but developed a peaceful approach to the issues that previously fuelled their jihad. “They are very close to making the jump from the Salafist movement to the moderate Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood,” said Habib.
The only thing holding them back from playing an active political role within the Egyptian system they once tried to destroy is permission from State Security.
Imam – the former leader of an even more militant group, the author of books employed by bin Laden and Zawahiri – is one of the few militants who possesses the credentials and influence to produce a comprehensive and persuasive reappraisal of jihad.
Had he really done so, there would be reason to believe that jihadist groups throughout the region might have taken notice.
Yet neither the Revisions nor The Exposure attempts to go beyond a simple attack on al Qa’eda’s tactical choices. “Imam is not capable of thinking outside of a jihadist framework,” said Tamem. All of his criticisms are aimed at jihadist tactics, not whether participating in violent jihad in itself is a bad thing.”
For now Imam presents neither a revolt from within nor a compelling alternative to al Qa’eda for would-be jihadists.
His allegations against Zawahiri and bin Laden may damage their reputations, but it’s hard to imagine any shift in the health of the jihad as a whole – which is less an organisation than a decentralised and disorganised ideological movement.
Disputes between the movement’s nominal leaders, hiding in Afghanistan, are unlikely to have any effect on jihadist groups in places like Algeria or Saudi Arabia.
As Hussam Tamem says, “This is not a serious work based on jihadist logic but simply a personal battle between Zawahiri and Imam.” Others were more blunt: “This is an embarrassment,” the former al Jihad member Kamal Habib told the Associated Press. “I don’t think he realises what this does to his image.”
None of the Egyptian experts I spoke with believe Imam’s work will exert any influence on jihadists around the world, especially as long as their chief grievance, the foreign policy of the United States, remains the same.
“Their jihad will continue until their grievances are met,” said Khalil Anani. If anything, Imam’s pointed attacks on the sloppy murder of civilians and Muslims may bring about more discipline in jihadist violence against Americans and American interests overseas.
Al Qa’eda may yet face a revolt from within – but it seems unlikely to come from Sayyid Imam.
Nathan Field is a journalist based in Cairo and Washington.
